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Preface
When I began to study philosophy, I found many terms
very perplexing. The way philosophers were using terms just
didn t fit with my experience. As a newcomer to philosophy,
1 could not be expected to have a clear sense of the terms
in question. On the other hand, my background was not like
that of the typical philosophy grad student, fresh from the
formative experience of undergraduate philosophy courses and
without significant exposure to other disciplines. I came
to philosophy after a twenty year career in the management
of technical scientific and engineering information and
operations. I had already completed masters degrees in both
management and computer science and had become a 'de facto’
1 n t e r d i s
c
1 p 1 i na
r
1 an . It was natural that 1 turned to the
study of philosophy, the forerunner of interdisciplinary
studies.
My main purpose has been and will probably always be to
force a high degree of coherency and consistency into ray
world-model. Although, I started with the so-called ’hard’
sciences of mathematics and physics, ray main interest has
been in the development of a model of thought and
understanding, and the present work provides foundations for
that effort.
Ac know 1 edgemen t s
I wish to acknowledge the mentorship of Bruce Aune
,
without which this project could never have been completed.
While we have differences, I have felt a kinship to his
brand of philosophy. Bruce’s many hours of patient
discussion have guided me to where 1 am now. 1 wish also to
thank Gary Hardegree for his assistance and patience in the
development of this work.
I am also indebted to A. E. Van Vogt, whose novel The
World of Null-A first introduced me to general semantics and
Alfred Korzybski. It was through the me
d
i um of Korzybskian
general semantics and its emphasis on Karl Popper that I
became intensely interested in the philosophy of science and
philosophy in general.
1 wish also to acknowledge the influence of the
writings of Russell Ackoff, Nina Bull, Patricia Churchland,
Fred Dretske, Fred Emery, Douglas Hoffstadter, Thomas Kuhn,
and Karl Pribram, all of whom have contributed significantly
to my present view.
Finally, I wish to thank Virginia Sturtevant for her
effort in editing this document and her patience with me
through the development of this thesis.
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CHAPTER I
I NTRODUCT
I
ON
.
Perception, Representation, and Reference:
Some thoughts on an Essential Structure
o r
Can philosophers afford to let computer
scientists solve a 2500 year old problem?
The growth of scientific knowledge has occurred at an
erratic pace. Periods of relative stability, in which it
was believed that the main structures of knowledge had been
found -- that it remained only to ’fill in the details’ --
were interspaced with periods of transition and change in
which the models which guided the search for new knowledge
were themselves ripped asunder. Thomas Kuhn has pointed out
that these ’paradigm shifts’ occurred as the burden of
anomalous bits of information overwhelmed a standing
paradigm and required a significant reorganization of the
theory, sometimes even to the point of changing the meaning
or sense of major terras 1 . It is just such an accumulation
of information that is ’at odds’ with traditional
philosophical views and that requires a shift in our use of
the terms ’refer’, ’represent’ and ’perceive’.
A certain insulation exists between diverse fields of
study by virtue of the compa r tmen t a 1 1 z a t 1 on which has
1
2occurred. Progress in one field often goes unnoticed by
another field for an extended period of time.
I have been informed that there are many philosophers
who take pride in not knowing what modern science has to
offer
- 1 find such an assertion amusingly depressing in
view of the fact that philosophy means love of wisdom, or
love of knowledge, and that the philosophical tradition has
been the search for knowledge.
It requires an interdisciplinary focus to correlate the
knowledge in different fields. Upon us today are the
interdisciplinary fields of cognitive science and artificial
intelligence. Philosophy needs to take notice of the growth
of knowledge in those fields, and not from just a
’territorial’ perspective.
Many terms are common to these areas and philosophy.
However, the use put to many of these terms by philosophers
was often at odds with the use within the scientific and
engineering universes of discourse. While reading
philosophical materials and engaging in discussions with
philosophers, I continually encountered anomalies in the
usage of significant terms. What the philosophers wrote and
said simply did not make sense in the context of my
experience.
I was experiencing the same kind of thing that Thomas
3Kuhn wrote about in the case of philosophers reading ancient
texts*. My paradigm was different and I had to learn the
paradigm of the philosopher in order to understand what was
written and said. 1 finally realized that philosophy is not
a single consistent whole. Philosophy is more like
management than science; it is an eclectic collection of
inconsistent points of view, whereas science strives to be a
single consistent whole.
Don Kerr said that, in using symbols, we evoke the
experiential elements of the listener 3
. The listener brings
his experiential elements to the symbol heard. These
experiential elements are not the same as those of the
speaker. If the listener has not experienced the activity
the speaker seeks to elicit, then the experiences must be
provided before understanding is possible.
The Sufi say that someone cannot understand something
on the first exposure 4
. Nevertheless, one needs to be
exposed to it so that one will be capable of understanding
it at a later time when one encounters it again. So, too,
is it with philosophical terms.
Often a philosophical term is used in many ontologies
with slightly different senses in each. There is often
enough overlap so that a statement made from the perspective
of one speaker having one ontological commitment seems
4acceptable from the perspective of another speaker having
another ontological commitment. The speaker and the
listener both agree with the statement, but each has a
(slightly) different meaning for it and neither considers
that the other might not mean what Cs)he thinks. Many
statements are required to specify an ontological commitment
(often volumes are not enough).
I think that the related terms "perception",
"representation", and "reference" all share the notion of
"aboutness". The basic ways these terms are used can be
accounted for without any special relation; aboutness can be
reduced to cause and effect. Showing the reduction requires
elaborating its structure. To illustrate that structure 1
will provide the experiential elements necessary and the
initial exposure needed for later understanding. Fitting
the structure together requires a shift in the meanings of
the terms ’perception’, ’reference’ and ’representation’.
Examining the necessary shift in meaning requires a
more than superficial examination of the usages in the
computer science domain. In this thesis 1 shall examine a
structure which seems essential to reference,
representation, and perception.
The structure is motivated by the paradigm of ’hard’
science, in which the only connections that can occur
5between things is via an exchange of physical energy. It is
necessary to frame our inquiry in terms of this paradigm.
My intent here is to present a ’minimal’ model. That
is, 1 will describe the smallest structure in which the
simplest kinds of reference and representation occur, and
provide an account for the simplest kind of perception. The
model presented will shed light on our corresponding
ordinary notions and show that they can all be explained or
accounted for entirely within the cause effect paradigm. In
effect, I will present the ’essence’ of each of reference,
representation, and perception.
Of course, selecting a thing presumes that it is
distinguished from other things. I do not intend to solve
the problem of identity here; likewise I do not intend to
resolve the difficulties which are associated with the
distinction often drawn by philosophers between form and
substance. Let us not be sidetracked in our discussion of
aboutness with issues central to other problems.
By assuming the form/substance distinction and
identity, we can distinguish between energy and information.
Information can be reproduced; energy cannot. Energy may be
required to ’make a copy’, but the energy in the copy is
different from the energy in the original, whereas the
information in the copy is the same as the information in
6the original. These notions I take as given
The
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illustrate the reduction of
is motivated by the progress
Let the world be divided into a central processing unit
(CPU) and one or more peripheral processing units (PPU).
Let these units be connected by signal lines. Let the
signal lines be divided up into three types: address lines,
data lines, and control lines. Let the signals be of the
simplest kind, a simple selection between two kinds, high
and low. Call the high "1" and the low "0". This is the
form of the device.
In the manufacture of such a device, the high and the
low apply to voltages. Voltage differences cause currents
to flow. Changing currents cause magnetic fields to change.
Changing magnetic fields induce voltages in conductors. By
using the appropriate construction techniques, devices can
be manufactured in which a change in one parameter at one
point ’causes’ a change in another parameter at another
point by a long series of small cause-effect changes using
just the mechanisms cited. It is the architecture of the
system, the laying down of conductive paths, which
determine, by design, what parameters respond to which other
ones. For our purposes we only need to worry about a high
7or a low voltage at one point being ultimately caused by a
high or low voltage at another point. This is the substance
of the dev ice.
The form is controled by the particular configuration
of structures in the substance. The propagation of changes
throughout the substance determines the form (and hence the
abstract device) of which the substance is a particular
instantiation.
It is my intent to present a structure in which
reference is reduced to cause and effect. To do this I must
presume the ancient distinction between form and substance.
Its present instantiation is that of the distinction between
energy and information. Information can be copied, while
energy cannot. Information requires energy, but is not
energy. Whatever the copy is that is also the original is
its form. Whatever the copy is that is not the original is
its substance. Accounting for this distinction is beyond
the scope of the present work.
CHAPTER I I
A NEW LOOK AT REFERENCE IN THE LIGHT OF
MODERN COMPUTER SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE.
The growth of knowledge follows an exponential curve. »
Each new bit of information must be correlated with all the
previous bits. However, these correlations take time and
are not all done immediately upon the creation of a new bit
of information.
We have seen a compa r tmen t a 1 i z a t i on of knowledge into
fields. The correlation of new bits of knowledge across the
boundaries separating fields has been sporadic at best. The
phenomenonal growth of knowledge in the young field of
computer science has resulted in much new information which
has not been thoroughly correlated with the older and more
traditional fields of thought. My aim here is to make one
such correlation.
Philosophers have had some interest in the correlation
of knowledge in one field with that of another. A
particular form of correlation is the reduction of the
knowledge in one field to that of another. Such a reduction
proceeds by mapping items (terms and statements) in one
field to items in the other, and showing that the same
relations hold among both sets of items. The more specific
knowledge is said to be reducible to the more general case.
8
9As an example, the laws of optics are reducible to the laws
of electromagnetism. 6
In some cases the knowledge to be reduced may not have
been explicated to the level of detail of the reducing
knowledge. The more detailed structure provided in the
reduction can be said to 'fill out' weak or unknown areas in
the reduced knowledge structure, or even to provide missing
'explanations'. In any case, the reduction proceeds by an
appropriate mapping from selected items in one area to
selected items in the other area. A weaker form of such a
mapping is analogy. In analogy the mapping from the terms
of one area to the terms of the other area may be less well
defined or less compelling. My thoughts presented here flow
from the mapping of two structures. I shall make an
analogy, which 1 hope is c omp elling enough to serve as a
reduct ion.
A. The Computer - World Analogy
I make an analogy between a computer and the world.
The parts of the computer correspond to the parts of the
world and the connections between the parts of the computer
correspond to the relations between the parts of the world.
A certain amount of care must be exercised to prevent the
technical meaning of certain terms from confounding the
analogy. "Memory", for example, is used to describe
event-structures in people; it is also used to describe
parts of a computer. In my analogy, the central processing
unit (CPU) corresponds to a person and computer memory
locations correspond to places in the world (at which a
person could look). We must guard against thinking of these
memory locations as being within a person. To motivate my
analogy I shall describe a simple being in an equally simple
world.
1. A Simple Being in a Simple World
Carl Philip Ursa is a strange creature who inhabits an
equally strange world. Carl is a creature who has one hand
and one eye. Unfortunately, his eye is on the back of his
hand, so he cannot see what he is doing. He can either do
something with his hand, or turn it around and look at his
hand i wo r k
.
He lives in a simple world. The world has two places;
they are here and there. The world has two colors; there is
black and there is white. The only things Carl can do is to
paint here or there white or black, or look to see what
color is here or there.
As the greatest mathematician in his world, Carl has
figured out that he can represent the places in his world by
the digits "0" and "1". He has also adapted this scheme to
represent the colors with the same digits. Finally, he has
generalized this scheme to describe whether he is painting
or looking.
It didn’t take him long to figure out that his many
actions could be expressed as a 3 digit binary number. He
used the first digit for the location, the second digit for
his action, and the third digit for the color. "Ill"
represented seeing black here. "101" painting black here,
"110" represented seeing white here, "Oil" represented
seeing black there, and so forth.
2. Corresponding Things with Memory
The ’things’ in Carl’s world consist only of the places
here and there. In the analogy between Carl’s world and a
computer, these two locations correspond to computer memory
locations. The colors white and black correspond to the
contents which could be stored in a computer memory
location, namely 0’s and l’s.
3. Corresponding People with CPU’s
Carl himself corresponds to the CPU in the computer.
Painting corresponds to writing and looking corresponds to
reading. When Carl looks at a location, his act corresponds
to the CPU reading the corresponding location.
The level at which the analogy becomes useful involves
a finer sub-division than heretofore described. However,
the detailed knowledge of our human processing of
information is less exact and greatly complicated by its
complexity. There is, however, ample knowledge available in
the computer and engineering fields to provide a more fine
grained structure on the computer side of the analogy. It
is ray hope that this more finely structured knowledge will
actually shed light on our own processes, and ultimately,
give us a r educ t 1 on 1 s t 1 c account of reference. Let us
proceed by examining that structure in more detail.
B. The Computer Model in Detail
In the world of the CPU, its memory devices, and
interconnections, cause-effect connections are clear and
easily described. The structure and the terms which
describe it and how it functions may be unfamiliar to most
philosophers. Also, computer scientists have not taken the
time to describe the essential features of the structure
which impact philosophical considerations; they are too busy
with the engineering aspects of the design. Computer
scientists and engineers are more interested in making the
structure do things than examining how its abstract
structure can serve as a model.
I have the experience with computers and engineering
and I have the philosophical interest to examine the
r ami f i ca t i ons
.
Loosely, I shall show how the CPU 'refers'
to memory devices and how that reference cumulates in the
CPU representing the data of that memory location.
Examining the computer model in more detail requires
examining each of the components and the interconnections in
more detail. So far we have a CPU and two memory locations,
each of which can be written to and each of which can be
read from. Each memory location can store only one bit of
information (corresponding to the colors white and black).
Distinguishing which of the two memory locations to select
requires one bit of information. Distinguishing which
action the CPU takes, read or write, requires one bit of
information. Following Carl’s lead, if we use ’A’ for the
action choice, *C’ for the color selection, and 'L’ for the
location choice, the three bit binary number ’LAC’ describes
the possible choices.
( L ) oca t ion ( A ) c t i on (C) o 1 o r
there tread 1 black
0 there 0 write 0 white
So far, I have been describing the computer in terms of
its "form" or logical structure. 0’s and l’s are symbols
which don’t exist in the physical structure of the computer.
0’s and l’s here just mean low and high voltages in an
electrical circuit. From a Texas Instruments component
specification (data sheet) the low voltage is from 0 to .4
volts and the high voltage is from 2.4 to 5.5 volts. When
we speak of a CPU writing to or reading from a memory
location, we are in effect speaking about the changing of
voltages in various parts of the system.
1. Hardware Components in Detail
The physics of electromagnetism is assumed here; only a
few qualitative relations are required. Voltage differences
cause currents to flow. As currents start and stop magnetic
fields arise and collapse. Changing magnetic fields induce
voltages. By the appropriate construction techniques,
devices can be manufactured in which a change in one
parameter at one point causes a change in another parameter
at another point by a long series of small cause-effect
changes using only the mechanisms cited. It is the
architecture of the system, the laying down of conductive
paths, which determine, by design, what parameters respond
to which other ones. The design of these systems can be
fully realized with appropriately timed, electrically
operated switches.
The "zeroth" generation computers were solenoid control
circuits; the first generation computers were made with
vacuum tubes; the second generation computers were made with
transistors; the third generation computers were made with
integrated circuits; and forth generation computers are made
with large scale integrated (LSI) circuits. At each stage
“'switching" devices were smaller, using less power, and
becoming more densely packaged. They are also better
understood. For my purposes the only point to keep in mind
is that of a high or a low voltage causing another high or
low voltage. This is the substance of the device.
The form is controlled by the particular configuration
of structures in the substance. The propagation of changes
throughout the substance determines the form (and hence the
abstract device) of which the substance is a particular
instantiation. (I accept and use the ancient form/substance
distinction without trying to resolve its difficulties.)
Thus far I have said that the CPU can read or write.
Our CPU can select one of two memory devices; each memory
device needs to detect whether it is the selected device. A
memory device also needs to detect which action is
specified, read or write. The CPU controls the action,
providing the value to be written and receiving the value
read. When the CPU writes, the memory device must receive
the value provided by the CPU and must store it. When the
CPU reads, the memory device must provide the value stored
back to the CPU. These requirements determine the form the
device must take. Also, the nature of the interconnection
of the memory device with the CPU needs explication.
Thus far 1 have spoken of the device level of structure
and cited a need tor a more detailed level of description.
To avoid confusion 1 shall call s ub- s t r uc t u r e s "components".
To construct a memory device certain components are
required. Components have inputs and outputs. The inputs
and outputs can be high or low voltages ("logic 1" or "logic
0" state). Most components also have a third state, called
the ’high impedence* state, which, as they say in the trade,
can be connected to its input or output (or both). One can
think of such a device as having three internal connections
for each output line; one connection is to a high voltage
source, the second connection is to a low voltage source or
drain’ (ground), and the third connection is to a "Y"
resistor network which has large values of resistance in
legs connecting to both the high and low voltage sources.
It is electrically equivilent to disconnecting the output
from both the high and low voltage sources.
About the Inputs and Outputs
Components’ outputs are capable of "driving" a line up
to a high voltage, or down to a low voltage. Connecting the
output to a power supply drives it up; connecting the output
to a ground drives it down. Obviously, conflict can occur
if two devices’ outputs try to drive a line in opposite
directions (something design engineers are paid to prevent).
Inputs are usually designed to require very little actual
current in operation (industry competition leads to a supply
of components with lower and lower power requirements).
When the high impedence state is connected to the input of a
component, the component does not respond to voltages on the
input line; the component’s input is, in effect,
disconnected. Similarly, when the high impedence state is
connected to the output of a component, the component does
not drive the output line -- in effect, disconnecting the
output. Connecting the high impedence state is like opening
a switch connecting the device, thereby "disconnecting" it.
Most components have a special (designated) input line which
determines when the high impedence state is selected; this
line is called the 'chip enable’, or just plain ’enable’
line. When the enable input is inactive the component will
be connected to the high impedence state.
To keep things simple, I shall use ’positive logic’
components only. In such components a high voltage
instantiates a ’ 1 or a logical ’true’. Accordingly, a
component is placed in the high impedence state
(disconnected) when the enable line is low, or logic 'O’. A
high or ’1’ on the enable line, in effect, connects the
component
.
Now the core of a memory device is the component which
’remembers’ the value written into the memory device. That
component must hold its value (until a change is enabled).
Such a component is a simple latch
A Latch
A latch is a component which has an input line, an
output line, and an enable line. The high impedence state
is connected to the input of the component when the enable
line is not high. The latch drives its output all the time.
When the enable input is raised, the value of the output is
set to the value of the input. When the enable line is
lowered again the value of the output line remains what had
been the value of the last input.
Writing into a memory device ultimately enables a
storage latch. The value of the line connected to the input
of the latch must be set high or low before the component is
enabled. Then, when the enable line is activated, the
output value of the latch is set to that input value. See
figure 1 .
Of course, a memory device which is always providing
its value is not very practical. We need a component to
disconnect the value of the storage cell. Such a component
is a driver.
A Driver
A driver is a component which has an input line, an
output line, and an enable line. The high impedence state
IS connected to the output of the component when the enable
line is not high. The driver responds to its input all the
time. When the enable line is raised, the value of the
output is set to the value of the input. When the enable
line is lowered again the output is connected to the high
impedence state.
In constructing a memory device, the output of the
storage latch is connected to the input of the driver. When
the memory device is read, the driver is enabled. See
figure 2 .
So far our memory device has an input line which is
connected to the input of the latch, an output line which is
connected to the output of the driver, and two other lines.
One is connected to the latch enable and allows writing to
the memory cell; the other is connected to the driver enable
and allows reading from the memory cell.
Since the CPU can either read or write but not do both
at the same time, the logical relation between the value of
read and write is complementary. Recall that Carl’s
representation system has one bit to represent the CPU
action; 1 controls read and 0 controls write. If we connect
the line which conveys this bit of information to the driver
enable line, the memory device will respond with its
contents whenever the CPU signals a read by setting the
20
control line to 1. However, we cannot connect the same line
to the enable of the latch, as it will respond to the 1
resulting in writing into memory at the same time. The
latch needs to be disabled when the control signal is a 1.
It also needs to be enabled when the control signal is a 0.
If a 1 signals a read, then its complement, a 0, signals a
write, and vice versa. To accomplish this we need another
simple device, an inverter.
An Inverter
An inverter is a component which has an input line and
an output line; it has no high impedence state. An inverter
responds to its input all the time and drives its output all
the time. When the input line is raised, the value of the
output is set to the low value. When the input line is
lowered the output is set to the high value. An inverter
instantiates the logical NOT relation and is sometimes
called a NOT gate.
Accordingly, we can add an inverter into our simple
memory device; we connect the control line to the input of
the inverter and the output of the inverter to the latch
enable line. Now, a logic 1 on the control line enables the
driver resulting in a read, but because the inverter
inverted the 1 to a 0, the latch is not enabled. Similarly,
a logic 0 on the control line fails to enable the driver,
but because the inverter inverted the 0 to a 1
, the latch is
enabled, resulting in a write. See figure 3
This device has one drawback as it now stands. it is
always in the read or write mode. Our system will have two
such memory cells and one must be inactive when the other is
active. The present design does not have the equivalent of
the high impedence state which is available at the component
level. We need to be able to fix it so that a memory cell
can be quiescent.
We will need the equivalent of an enable line which
will turn the device on to be read or written to, but
otherwise turn the device off. In other words, we want to
enable the device whenever it is to be read or written to
and when a device enable line is activated. To do this we
need another component. Such a component is an AND gate.
An AND gate
An AND gate is a component which has two input lines
and one output line. The AND gate drives its output all the
time. When either input is raised, the value of the output
is set to the value of the other input. When either input
line is lowered the value of the output line is lowered.
To improve our memory device we add a device enable
line. An AND gate connecting the enable line is inserted in
22
the control line connecting to the driver so that the output
of the driver is enabled by a combination of BOTH the enable
line being 1 and the control line being 1. Similarly an AND
gate connecting the enable line is inserted in the inverted
control line connecting to the latch so that the input to
the latch is enabled by a combination of BOTH the enable
line being 1 and the control line being 0 (the output of the
inverter being 1). in this manner our memory device is
activated only when the device enable line is raised. See
figure 4 .
This simple memory device is not quite adequate for our
purposes yet. We need two such device, one for each
location. Moreover, the two devices must not respond at the
same time. Only one or the other can respond.
In Carl’s representation system, the third bit of data
represents the location selected. Since one memo ry location
is to be activated by a '1', and the other memo ry location
is to be activated by a ’O', we can use another inverter in
one memory cell to invert the memory device select
information bit. Our device enable line activates one
memory location when it is 1 and activates the other
location when it is 0. Since this line selects between
locations, it is called the address line. In one memory
cell the address line is connected directly to AND gates
connected to the latch and driver. In the other memory cell
23
the address line is first inverted before connection to AND
gates connected to the latch and driver. See figure 5.
2. The CPU Interface to its Outside.
Equally important is the interface between the CPU and
the memory devices. An explanation of the entire structure
of the CPU is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
necessary to describe part of its structure.
The interface between the CPU and its memory devices is
controlled by components, and the design of the CPU requires
some interconnection between these components. I won’t go
through the stages of building the interface in the same
manner that I did with the memory cell. The evolution of
the CPU through these stages is not important enough to
warrant the time and space. Suffice it to say that the
important aspects of the CPU for our purposes here is the
structure of its interface to the outside. While that
interface is part of the structure of the CPU, its design
makes communication with the memory devices well defined.
It has both efferent and afferent processes in its
connections to the outside and in its connections that go
deeper into the structure of the CPU.
On the Memory Side of the Interface
Afferent connections include the data line by which the
24
CPU writes into memory, the address line by which the CPU
selects which memory is to respond, and the control line by
which the CPU signals its intended action to read or write
to memory. The one efferent connection is the sense line by
which the CPU receives the contents of memory during a read.
On the Inside of the Interface (Deeper in the CPU)
Afferent lines include an address selection line, a
control selection line, and a data selection line. Efferent
lines include an address status line, a control status line,
and a data status line. The structure of the interface can
be thought of as a 3 bit control register and a 3 bit status
register. To use the interface, the control register is
loaded with the desired control word or the status register
is sampled. The status register contains the information
necessary to determine what the last action was. It
contains a 'record' of the values of the address, control,
and data (or sense) lines. See figure 6.
Addressing Memory Locations
In the number 1 memory device the address line is
connected to the AND gates connected to the latch and
driver. Setting the address line to 1 presets both these
gates. This will result in the number 1 memory device
responding. The value of the control line determines which
of these AND gates is activated. Since the address line is
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averted in memory device 0, the corresponding AND gate in
that memory cell will not be preset. Therefore, a high on
the address line will be passed through only in memory
device 1. Had the address line been set to 0, the inverter
in memory device 0 would have had a 1 as its output
presetting the AND gates in that memory device. Setting the
address line low or high selects which memory device is to
respond. See figure 7.
The control line must be set to 0 or 1 depending upon
whether the activated memory device is to accept or return
data. If the control line is set to 1, the value of the
data line does not matter, but if the control line is set to
0, the data line must be set to 0 or 1.
Storing Data in Memory
To store data in memory the data line must be set to
the datum to be stored (0 or 1). The memory device must be
selected by setting the address line to 0 or 1. And the
control line must be set to 0 (write). Since the control
line is set to 0, the AND gate connected to the driver will
not be preset and its output will remain low. As a result,
the driver will not be enabled. However, the 0 on the
control line is inverted before going into the AND gate
connected to the latch. With a 0 input to the inverter, the
output will be 1, presetting the AND gate connected to the
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latch.
The address line will be high or low. In memory cell 1
a value of 1 will activate the preset AND gate. In memory
cell 0 a value of 0 will be inverted and its output, 1, will
activate the preset AND gate. In either case the AND gate
output will be 1 and the latch will be enabled. The enabled
latch sets its output to the value of the data line. When
the address line drops, the latch continues to hold the
value it just received from its input, the data line.
Reading Data from Memory
To read data from memory the memory device must be
selected by setting the address line to 0 or 1. The control
line must be set to 1 (read). Since the control line is set
to 1, the AND gate connected to the driver will be preset.
Since the address line is high, the AND gate output will be
1 and the driver will be enabled. The enabled driver sets
its output to the value of the latch output. Since its
input is being held high or low by the output of the latch,
this value will be placed on the sense line. Again, the 1
on the control line is inverted before going into the AND
gate connected to the latch. With a 1 input the output of
the inverter will be 0 and the AND gate connected to the
latch will not be preset. Since that AND gate was not
preset, its output stays low, thus not enabling the latch,
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so its value remains unchanged.
Enab 1 i ng Action
In actual practice, an additional line is included
which synchronizes the communication between the CPU and the
memory devices. That line is normally low, but is raised,
held momentarily, and then dropped (pulsed) to signal to all
components in the CPU interface and in the memory devices
when switching is to take place. See figure 8. The pulse is
held high long enough for all transitions to stabilize and
then dropped; the latches throughout the system then hold
the values sensed at the time of the falling edge of the
enab 1 e pulse.
For most of my purposes, the enable line will be an
unnecessary complication and may be ignored; figure 7 will
be adequate. However, in some cases the enable line will be
necessary; figure 7 will then apply.
3. A Language to Describe the Happenings in the World.
Computer programming languages describe what actions a
computer is to take at our direction. There are many levels
of such languages. Most are high level languages which
describe happenings of interest to the programmer. But, all
such languages are ultimately implemented in terms of the
lowest level language which correlates directly with the
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architecture of the machine. Assembly language, as it is
called, maps its terms and syntax directly to the components
of the CPU and its memory locations, and the actions the CPU
can accomplish. Such a language includes terms for the
structures in the CPU and its possible actions.
The Things to be Named
In our computer, the CPU must refer to the two memory
locations and to the two possible values which might be
stored in memory. It must also refer to itself. In
referring to itself, it will need to distinguish between its
afferent and efferent processes, and to distinguish among
the individual bits of information in those processes.
0 = a low voltage or logic ’O’ (FALSE)
1 = a high voltage or logic (TRUE)
AB = Add r e s s bit (Values = 0 o r 1 )
A Z Address
CB = Control bit (Values = 0 o r 1 )
C = Control
DB = Data/ Sense bit (Values = 0 o r 1 )
D = Data
R = Register
CR Z Control Register ( = AB & CB & DB)
SR Z Status Register ( = AB & CB & DB)
The Actions to be Cited
Our language must also describe actions which the CPU
can accomplish. The actions the CPU can take consist of
setting bits in the control register, or sampling bits in
the status register. The general form used to describe such
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bit setting is chosen so that a combination of such actions
can be described in the same format.
MOV D , S = Move from (S)ource to (D)est mat ion.
Examp 1 e s
:
MOV A, 1 = Set the address b i t i n the control register t 0
MOV D, 1 = Set the data bit i n the control register to 1 .
MOV C, 0 = Set the control bi t i n the control register t o
The same language syntax can be used to describe
sequences of these immediate moves. The three examples
immediately above performed in the given sequence result in
writing a 1 into location 1, and can be more compactly
expressed as:
MOV ( 1 ) , 1 = Write 1 to the location 1
This format introduces the syntax used to distinguish the
contents of a source or destination from the value of its
name. It is necessary when symbolic source and destinations
are used.
() = Contents of
More examp 1 e s
:
MOV A,1 = Set the address bit in the control register to 1.
MOV (A),l = Write a 1 into the location addressed by A.
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Th.s level of flexibility is more meaningful to us in that
it collects groups of ’low-level’ actions under a single
descr ipt ion.
The two actions the CPU is capable of are reading and
writing to memory. It does this by setting the values of
the bits in the control register.
MOV C, 1 = Read
.
MOV C
,
0 = Write.
When these actions take place other things happen that are
better described as:
MOV (A) , D = Write to memory.
MOV D,(A) = Read from memory.
This one syntax captures different points of view. The
former example describes what is happening within the CPU
interface, while the latter describes what happens in the
entire computer as a result of what happens within the CPU
interface. The distinction is analogous to the distinction
between the perspectives of phenomenalism and realism. The
later description holds whenever the former holds only if
the devices external to the CPU are connected and are
operating properly.
4 Additional Partial Structures
Canca t ona t i ng Structures
Canca tona
t
1 ng structures have already been implicitly
discussed. Circuits or lines which convey different bits of
information are laid down in logically parallel paths.
Frequently these paths are implemented with physically
parallel circuits. By referring to the control and status
registers as 3 bit devices, it is assumed that the bits are
considered together. Canca t ona
t
i ng circuits add parallel
lines.
Logical Structures
1 have
a NOT gate,
constructed
alieady discussed an AND gate and an inverter or
Using Demorgan’s law, an OR gate can be
from these devices.
A OR B = NOT (NOT A AND NOT B).
Abstract i ng
An abstracting structure
or fewer outputs than inputs,
number of outputs as inputs.
Shift
St ructures
i s any circuit with the same
A NOT ga t e has the s ame
An AND ga t e has f ewe r
.
Reg i s t e r
A shift register has several parallel outputs, one
input and an enable line. When the enable line is pulsed,
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the values of the outputs are shifted’ and the latest input
IS placed on the first output. A shift register can
’remember' a sequence of inputs. The parallel outputs
contain the history of the input.
Suppose we connected 3 64-bit shift registers to the
efferent processes in the CPU interface. By aligning the
outputs we could go back as many as 64 read and write cycles
and have a (moving) record of the past actions by the CPU.
These triples of lines could be connected to all manner of
additional circuits for comparison, etc.
5. Some Additional Considerations
Hardware Circuits to Software
Computer scientists have shown that any hardware
circuits that can be wired up, can be simulated in software
on a serial computer. The advantage of hard-wiring a
circuit is its speed. Software processing takes much more
time than hardware circuits.
Parallel to Serial Circuits
Additionally, parallel circuits can be implemented
serially. For example, to represent three parallel circuits
in a single serial circuit, the serial circuit is divided up
in time by thirds, with each third dedicated to the
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corresponding parallel line. This 'time division
multiplexing', as it is called, allows simulating any
parallel configuration serially.
Intel 1 i gence
It is beyond the scope of this paper to account for
intelligence. Computer scientists have argued both for and
against machine intelligence. One problem is that
intelligence is not well-defined. If it can be specified
precisely, then the question of machine intelligence will be
answerable. I shall only allude to certain features
attributed to intelligence.
C . Wh ere Reference Fits in
By 'reference' we ordinarily speak of something being
about something else. A person talks about something. A
symbol stands for its referent. A long-standing
philosophical question is: How is a s ymbo 1 ’connected’ with
its referent?
1- Distinguishing Between Derived and Primary forms of
Reference.
I think that, like Bruce Aune ’ s distinctions among
types of existence, 7 there are distinctions among types of
reference. There are derived and primary forms of
reference
.
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Derived Reference
Derived forms ultimately depend upon primary forms. I
think that symbols referring to objects is a derived form.
It is the use of these symbols by people that endows the
connection. It is people’s use of symbols to refer to
things that creates this derived form. I will not be
directly dealing with the (derived) forms of reference
philosophers talk of when they use terms like "Easter
Bunny
, unicorn
, etc., although the proposed mechanism
will account for these forms.
Primary Re f e r ence
People referring to things is primary. People select a
thing in their environment and use something else in place
of the selected thing in certain contexts (speech, art,
etc)
. It is because people use things in place of others
that secondary forms of reference arise. The primary form
of reference is comprised of selection and substitution.
The selection is made among things in the environment.
Actually, the selection is made among representations of
things in the environment, but the details of this process
will not become evident until later on in this work.
Philosophers call it intension.
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Selection as its Essence
The primary form of reference is this selection
process. One refers to something when one selects that
thing from among others. The most immediate secondary form
of reference, so immediate that I have chosen to include it
with the discussion of primary reference, is the use of a
token to indicate such a selection. A token or symbol is
substituted for the object selected (in information
contexts). There is presumed to be a connection between the
symbol and the object; likewise there is presumed to be a
connection between internal representation and things in the
env i r onmen t
.
With the possible exception of the skeptics, we talk,
believe, etc, as if we are selecting from among the objects
in our environment, when we are actually selecting from
among their internal representations. We take our internal
representations to ’refer’ to external objects.
Realistically, we could characterize reference as the
mechanism by which our representations interact with things.
An intension is nothing more than selecting among internal
representations; follow-on behavior brings us to take some
action involving the selected object itself. Skeptically,
we have no access to things except via our internal
representations. An intension is nothing more than
selecting among internal representations; follow on behavior
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br.ngs us to subsequent representations which still include
the selected one. Of course, In the realistic case, our
only confirmation of the action Involving the selected
object is in the subsequent representations.
There are two fundamental structures in the primary
form of reference; they are the mechanism of selection and
mechanism of connection between representations and objects.
What is a representation? A representation is a different
instantiation of the form of something. The representation
is processed instead of there being a direct interaction
with the object; we operate on information about things
rather than on the things themselves. Since information
about a thing is a representation of it, we have substituted
a representation for a thing in these contexts.
In communication we make a simple substitution of one
thing for another with the expection that other people will
know to 'reverse' the substitution. It is the intension by
a person that is the primary form of reference.
In intending something a person must pick out that
thing from among the many in the environment. To refer to
something is to select that thing from among many. I can go
pick it up, point at it, or use some token to stand for it,
(assuming that another will not take the token as the
object).
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It may be argued that this form of reference depends
upon the internal representation of the objects to be
selected, and the problem of representation is the other
side of the same coin of which reference is cast. It is
only because the internal representation 'refers', in some
mysterious way, to the objects that an intension functions
to select that object. I claim that selection takes place
among the representations, but that representations can be
explained in a manner that sheds light on primary reference
I will come back to this, but first I shall look at what
happens during reference in our model.
2. What Happens During Memory Reference.
There are two ways to refer to memory, read and write.
A memory reference is either a read opeation or a write
operat ion.
Selecting a Memory Location
The CPU sets the address bit in the control register to
0 or 1. From the point of view of the CPU, that’s all that
can be done. The rest is up to its outside world. The
world outside the CPU consists of the memory. It is the
structure of the memory that determines what happens in
response to the selection made by the CPU.
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Events in the CPU Interface
During a memory reference the CPU sets the three bits
in the control register to the desired value. The address
select bit is set to 0 or 1 to select which memory is to
respond. The control bit is set to 0 or 1 depending upon
whether the reference is a read or a write. And, if the
reference is a write, the data bit is set to 0 or 1, the
value to be written into the selected memory location.
In the system design without an enable line, the CPU is
always referring to one memory location or to the other.
There is no time when the reference does not occur. But, in
the system design in which the enable line has been added,
memory reference occurs only when the enable line is pulsed.
Events in the Memory Interface
When a memory reference is made by the CPU, it places
values on the lines connecting the memory devices with the
CPU. The individual memory cells respond to the values on
these lines. The address line value is responded to in one
cell. If it is high, memory cell 1 is enabled. If it is
low, memory cell 0 is enabled.
3. The Reduction of Reference to Cause-Effect.
We can describe the events occurring during a memory
reference entirely in cause-effect terms. It is the level
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of abstraction of our description that makes the difference
in the t e rms used
.
Primary Reference by the CPU
During a memory reference the CPU is selecting a 0 or a
1 to place on the address line. A certain value is placed
on a certain line. Also, a 0 or a 1 is selected to place on
the control line. Again, a certain value is placed on a
certain line. If the value selected for the control line is
a 0, then a 0 or a 1 must also be placed on the data line.
So, from the point of view of the CPU, certain affector
actions are taken, and nothing more. The only thing being
done by the CPU is the selection of a triple of values to be
placed in the control register. It would correspond to Carl
choosing whether to look or to paint, and whether to do it
here or there, and whether to use black or white. However,
the entire action by the CPU consists only of selecting
certain affector values. Since the CPU has efferent
processes connected to the afferent processes, it has
available a record of its own actions.
By looking at those efferent bits of information in
isolation we can see some additional correlations. The
address bit has the information of which memory was
selected. The control bit has the information of whether
the action was to read or write. The data/sense bit has the
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information of which color was present. 'Understanding 1
which action was taken requires all three bits of
information, what, where, and what result. To look at only
one bit in isolation does not present the whole picture.
Suppose, for example, one abstracted the sense bit and
the control bit and selected cases in which the control bit
was 1. This corresponds to just seeing, without regard for
where. The phenomena 1 i s t s are fond of speaking of the 'raw
feel’ of a white expanse. It is clear that such a
perspective is nothing more than 'just seeing 1 as described
above. It is incomplete interface information. For the
information to be meaningful, the third bit, location, must
be added. That information is, however, a feed-back of a
selected afferent process on the part of the CPU. Still, it
could be argued that phenomena 1 i s t s really intends to
include all three bits of information, but that would make
their position inconsistent. One cannot ’just see 1 when one
already knows where one is, that is, where one intended to
go
.
Effects in Memo r y
It is the structure of memory that allows reference by
the CPU. A high voltage on the address line and a low
voltage on the control line has the following effect. The
inverter in memory cell 1 is caused to have a high voltage
output. This output, in turn, is a contributory cause
which, together with the high voltage on the address line,
causes the output of the AND gate connected to the latch in
memory cell 1 to go high. This high voltage, in turn, is a
contributory cause of the output of the latch. The output
of the latch is caused to go high or low, depending upon the
level of its input line when the contributory cause, the
enable line being high, occurs.
Similarly, a high voltage on the address line and on
the control line causes the AND gate in device 1 connected
to the driver to connect a high voltage to the enable line
of the driver in that cell. The high voltage on the enable
line of the driver causes the value at its input to be
reproduced at its output. Since this line is connected back
to the CPU, the net effect is that a high voltage on both
the address line and the control line ultimately causes a
high or a low voltage to appear on the sense line. Which it
causes depends upon the most immediately prior occurrence of
a high on the address line and a low on the control line as
de s c r i bed above
.
Differences Between Read and Write
The CPU controls whether a read or a write occurs by
presenting a 0 or a 1 on its control line to its outside
world. The relevant difference occurs in the CPU interface.
4 2
If the control bit is a 1, it enables a driver connected to
the sense line.
If the control bit is 0, it is inverted and that
inverted value enables a driver connecting the data line
back to the sense line. When a write operation occurs, the
value of the data line is not a reproduction of the effect
in the environment, but is only a copy of the color bit
selected (intended). This is purely a reflection of the
internal se 1 ect i ons
.
In the case of a read, when the control line is 1, the
driver connected to the sense line from the outside world is
enabled. In this case the efferent processes contain a
mixture of reflections of the internal selections and one
bit of external sense. One might say that the single bit
sensed is ’qualified’ by the selected or intended action.
To know that that bit represents what was in memory, the
control bit must be present and it must be 1 (read).
D. Where Representation Fits In
So far I have used the term representation loosely;
however, that use has been consistent with the following.
We typically see representation as the inverse relation to
reference. If a thing is referred to by a symbol, that
symbol represents the thing.
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'• Distinguishing between Primary and Derived forms of
Represent a t i on
.
There are primary and derived forms of representation
just as there are primary and derived forms of reference A
thing represents another just in case some person uses that
thing to refer to the other.
Copying as Primary Representation
A bit of information can have only one of two values, 0
or *• If a bit of information is to represent another bit of
information, there are only two possibilities. A 1
represents a 1 and correspondingly a 0 represents a 0, or a
1 represents a 0 and correspondingly a 0 represents a 1.
While it might be possible to use the inversion scheme, the
1-1 and 0-0 scheme is natural. A 1 represents a 1 and a 0
represents a 0.
For representation to occur, the representing bit must
differ from the represented bit in some characteristic.
Since a 1 is just a 1, the difference cannot be in form; the
value of the bit is just copied. The only characteristic
possible is its location. A bit in one location represents
a bit in another location if it is a copy of that bit.
However, a more stringent connection is required. The copy
must be taken from the original so that the value of the bit
in one location is guaranteed to be the same as the value of
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the bit in the other location. This guarantee can be had
only if the representation bit is caused by the bit it
represents. Since the value of the bit is produced by
cause-effect connections from another, and it is the same as
the value of the other, the value of the other is reproduced
or copied at the second location.
Representation is not exactly the inverse relation of
reference, but it functions that way at most derived levels.
Association as Secondary Representation
At the base level a 1 in one location is associated
with a 1 at another location. However, at higher levels,
more than one bit of information may be present. Any 1-1
and onto mapping between one set of bits and another
(including inversion) instantiates the ’connecting’ of one
thing (the input bit configuration) with another (the output
bit configuration). The hardware to instantiate such a
transformation requires merely permuting the lines and
inserting inverters.
Abstraction as Secondary Representation
Since we often think of something as representing more
than one other thing, selectively dropping bits in the
output set also yields our idea of representation. Any onto
function from one set of bits to another produces
representation.
still, the primary or base ease of representation is
the mere copying of bits of information.
2. What Happens During Representation.
In our CPU interface the content of a memory location
is copied onto the data line during a read. This data line
value is, in turn, copied onto the sense/data line in the
efferent process of the CPU. In the system with an enable
line designed in, that value is latched onto the efferent
line by the latches internal to the CPU. The connetion with
memory is severed, and a power failure in the memory
location would not be reproduced in the CPU interface.
Copying and Moving Data
A datum is the value of a bit of information. When a
write occurs, a datum to be written is placed on the data
line. That value is reproduced in the selected memory cell
by the end of the write cycle. During a read operation the
datum in the selected memory cell is copied onto the sense
line, and is ultimately reproduced on the data/sense line in
the efferent processes of the CPU interface. We often speak
of moving data. Moving data consists only of copying data
and then not caring about whether the original is
overwritten by something else.
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In a data move, the location characteristic is of
overriding importance. Reading from one location and
subsequently writing the same datum to another location
would constitute a data move external to the CPU. 1 have
not drawn circuitry to show how this would be achieved.
Additional latches and drivers in the CPU connecting the
efferent processes to the afferent processes would be
r equ i red.
Activating Dedicated Circuits
These additional circuits and components would be
constructed so that a datum could be moved within the CPU
from the efferent processes to the afferent processes. Each
kind of such an action would require a set of components,
have connections and have an enable line. In short, the CPU
would have internal devices which have special purpose
effects. One such device might be a simple comparator. A
comparator compares two values and outputs a true (1) if the
inputs match. This is just the logical relation of NOT
EXCLUSIVE OR. Since we only have AND and NOT gates, our
exclusive OR gate can be designed using the formula:
A CMP B = NOT (A AND NOT B) AND NOT (NOT A AND B)
Now that we have a comparator, we can build into the CPU a
circuit to ’recognize* a datura. One input to the comparator
is connected to the value to be recognized. To recognize a
1, the input is permanently connected to a high voltage
source. To recognize a 0, that input is permanently
connected to to a low voltage source. The other input to
the comparator is connected to the data line to be tested,
and the output is directed to specialized circuitry which is
to be activated whenever the test condition is met.
3. The Reduction of Representation to Cause-Effect.
Representing a datum is just copying it. The copying
process proceeds by cause-effect steps. In secondary forms
of representation more than one bit of information is
present, and representation is just a transformational
mapping to another set of bits. Each stage proceeds by
cause-effect steps.
E. Where Perception Fits In
Perception is usually applied to objects. One
perceives objects that are external to us by means of
recognizing certain patterns (including dynamic) in our
sensory inputs. Perception involves processes which are
’downstream’ from the efferent processes (higher level
abstract ions) .
1. What happens During Perception.
During Perception an analysis of the patterns in the
effector circuits and in higher level processes results in
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setting bits of information which signal the presence of the
conditions required for the particular perception.
Ded icated Circuits
The simplest way of instantiating perception is by the
use of dedicated circuits. A circuit which has comparators
and ’watches’ the efferent processes for a particular
combination of signals 'recognizes’ that a particular
effector pattern has occurred. Here’s an example. Connect
one input of a comparator circuit to the data line and the
other one to a high voltage (logic 1). Connect a second
comparator to the control line and the logic 1. Connect the
outputs of these two circuits to the inputs of an AND gate.
The output of the AND gate will be 1 whenever the control
line is 1 (read) and the data line is 1 (black). This
dedicated circuit responds to signal the condition "seeing
black"
.
The outputs of these dedicated circuits can be combined
with the efferent processes and/or with other such circuits
as inputs to additional circuits to form higher level
processing. For example, feed the output of the "seeing
black" circuit into a three bit shift register. Connect the
outputs of the shift register through AND and NOT circuits
according to the formula (A AND (NOT B) AND C). The output
of this new circuit signals "having seen black, white.
black". Just for drill, connect the seeing black output to
the input of a 6 trillion bit shift register and you get a
historical record of vision for this device. The ’memory’
of any particular seeing can be ’recalled' by computing
which output line to sample.
Preliminary Exposure
The Sufi say that one must first be exposed to
something so that, at the proper time, understanding will be
possible. More simply put, we understand in terms of our
prior experiences; new experiences serve as the exemplars
for understanding later, similar, experiences. Perception
of something requires that something similar had been
previously experienced. The essence of recognition is,
after all, ’cognizing’ again.
Just such a notion went into the design of hardware
which could be trained to recognize patterns. Perceptrons,
as these early devices were called, had two modes of
operation®. The first mode was the learning phase; patterns
observed were stored and integrated into a generalized
pattern recognizer. The other mode was the operating mode
in which the generalized pattern recognizer analyzed
incoming patterns and rendered a judgment that the sensed
pattern was or was not a case it had been trained to
r ecogn 1 z e
.
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While these devices had many levels of processing and
are now being seen as special cases of a more generalized
approach called network relaxation, the essential feature by
which we understand them is a simple comparison. The
devices are designed to compare inputs to previously
processed inputs and determine if the current input does or
does not fit the pattern. In these cases the patterns
entail much information. For our purposes, however, one bit
of information will suffice. We need only store a single
bit of information during the learning phase and compare
only one bit of information during the operation phase.
Also, in our simple device, the learning phase would consist
of a single trial inputting a single bit of information.
In such a device, there needs to be present a way of
’knowing' which phase the device is in. The epistemological
question can be represented by a single bit of information.
So, the one-bit perceptron has an input line to read in a
bit of information during the learning phase. It has an
output line which is meaningless before learning has taken
place, but which ’recognizes’ the input or signals that the
input is not the known input. It may also have another
output line, a status line, which signals whether it is in
the learning phase or has already been exposed to what it
can later recognize. Of course, engineers also build in a
'reset' line which puts the device back in the learning
A one-bit perceptron has two modes of operation. The
pristine state, unprogrammed, cannot perceive or recognize a
bit of information. The first exposure to a bit of
information ’programs' the device so that it may ’recognize’
the same value of that bit of information on later
encounters. In the programmed mode the device simply
responds with a bit of information which signals that the
input matches the stored value or that it does not, in short
whether it recognizes the value of the input.
This type of circuit is a ’programmable’ circuit. The
simplest example is a circuit which has an enable line, an
input line and an output line. The circuit functions like a
latch, except that it can only be enabled once. At the
first time that it is enabled, it sets its output to the
value of its input and then connects its enable line to the
high impedence state. Thereafter its output is always the
same as that first exposure.
The use of a circuit such as this is that it
’remembers’ its first experience. By combining such
circuits with dedicated circuits one can construct circuits
capable of permanently storing and recognizing patterns that
were ’learned’ from experience.
Subsequently, the same circuits that provided the
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programming can be compared to the output of the programmed
circuit. In this way, the pattern that first programmed the
circuit is 'recognized' by the previous programming. At the
base level, recognition is nothing more than a true output
of a simple comparator and a programmable circuit; at higher
levels it is the combined, permuted, abstracted, and
transformed matching of inputs to stored patterns.
2. Locating the Phenomenological Perspective.
In using our analogy between the CPU and a person, we
can see where the claims of phenomena 1 1 s t s apply. The CPU
interface has only one sense line; that line responds to
’whatever’ drives it. In the ’god’s eye view’ I have
presented we know what drives that line. Were we limited to
the perspective of the CPU we could not know that. All that
would be available to us is whatever patterns we could
abstract from the fluctuations of that sense line as
correlated with the other status lines.
The First Person Viewpoint
From the first person perspective the CPU has only what
information is derivable from its sense line input in
conjunction with its control and address line output. In
short, Carl can learn about the world only by going,
painting, and seeing. He knows that he can turn left or
right (to face here or there). He knows that he can look or
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paint. He knows that he can see black or white, and that he
can paint black or white. Nothing else can he directly
know. By recording which direction he faced, and whether he
painted or saw white or black, he can discover that he has
always seen black where he painted it last, and the same
with white. C ’Always
’ has a finite but large connotation.)
A circuit which could make such a detection would be too
complex to describe here, but such circuits are easily
constructed.
What Information is Inaccessible
Carl does not share our god’s eye view and cannot know
of the correlation between himself and the CPU. The CPU
cannot detect that there are two memory cells connected to
its lines. The actual structure connected to the signal
lines cannot be ’known’, but some of its characteristics may
be inferred from pattern analysis. It is just this
inaccessibility that leads to the phenomena 1 i s t perspective.
The Phenomena 1 i s t s claim that only the value of the sense
line is available. 1 think that this is not quite right.
We need more of the information available at the efferent
processes .
3. Where 'Qualia* Fit In.
Phenomena 1 i s t s speak of ’just seeing white'. I have
already shown that this involves abstracting from the
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efferent processes
information. It’s
it does show where
occur
.
by discarding the location bit of
not a very useful abstraction. However,
in the computer model that ’raw feels’
Representational Structure
Representing the outside world consists of abstracting
patterns from the efferent processes. While I have not
explicitly mentioned it, this included patterns involving
time, or sequences of inputs. To capture the notion of
time, there must be a ’clock’ in the CPU. The clock
ultimately controls the enable line, so that the efferent
processes are not constant, but change to different
configurations of 0's and l’s with each cycle of the clock.
Sensing Circuits
A sensation of ’sensing’ must ultimately be derived
from the control bit being 1 (read). The simplest level
includes 'just seeing white’ or 'just seeing black’. These
conditions can be detected by connecting the inputs of an
AND gate to the control line and to the sense line, or by
connecting the inputs of an AND gate to the control line and
to a NOT gate connected to the sense line. In either event,
the location bit is simply discarded.
Paterns in time can be abstracted by shift registers
55
and comparator circuits. A simple example would be a
circuit which shifted the sense and control bits with each
clock pulse. Suppose such a register held 40 such pairs.
Let there be a comparator device which outputs 1 (true) if
all 40 shift register output bits are i. (A comparator
device is composed of comparator components and AND gates.)
This line would signal the presence of extended ’just
seeing’. If the other 40 bits, the sense line, were also 1,
this would signal ’just seeing black'.
F. A Review of the Essential Structures Involved
The essential structures involved are built up entirely
of components having inputs and outputs capable of three
states, 0, 1, and the high impedence state. The components
include logical AND and NOT gates, a latch and a driver, and
a programmable latch; a comparator device is built of these
componen t s
.
It is, however, the form of the devices constructed
which illustrates the form of reference, representation,
and, to a degree, perception.
1. Selection by Cause and Effect.
The simplest form of selection is to choose between two
(things, etc.). Devices can be constructed which respond to
only one of two voltage levels. Setting the voltage level
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causes the appropriate device to respond while the
alternative device does not respond.
2. Reference as Selection.
By setting the voltage level on the address line, the
CPU selects which of two memory devices is to respond. In
doing so it ’refers’ to that device or location, so the
primary form of reference, selection, is instantiated in the
computer/CPU model. The CPU makes a memory reference by
selecting which voltage level to apply to its address line.
I have not gone into what processes, internal to the CPU,
result in its setting the address line high or low, but this
selection, in fact, causes which memory device is to
respond.
3. Copying by Cause and Effect.
The simple process of enabling a latch or a driver
allows the voltage value present at its input to be
replicated at its output. This ’copies’ the bit value from
one place to another. With appropriate circuitry, this
value can be copied anywhere. A latch makes a copy which
holds after the original is destroyed.
4. Representation as Copying.
The simplest form of representation is mere copying.
The value stored in a memory device is copied into the CPU
effector processes. As such, the value of the effector
processes ’represents' the contents of the memory device
from which it came.
5. Comparing by Cause and Effect.
At its simplest level, comparing is the inverse of the
exclusive OR relation. It can be constructed of NOT and AND
gates as described above. The output of such a circuit,
which is high if the inputs match and low if the inputs do
not match, is caused by its inputs.
6. Recognition as Comparing.
In recognition there are two stages. The first stage
is the storing of a pattern; the second stage is c omp a r i ng
an input with the stored pattern and signaling a match.
7. Perception as Cause and Effect.
Perception consists of recognizing patterns. This can
be accomplished by comparing input patterns to a stored
pattern and signaling a match Crecognizing a particular
thing), or signaling which of stored patterns matches the
input pattern (recognizing which thing). Since all the
processes going into this are realizable in a cause-effect
medium, so is perception. Therefore, perception is
accountable for by cause-effect.
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G. Generalizing the Essential Structure
The essential structure involves afferent and efferent
processes. Efferent processes include the status of the
afferent processes. Reference is selecting particular
afferent processes. It is the cause-effect events deriving
from the choice in selecting values for those afferent
processes that determines that something responds. It is
the response, in the world, that our afferent processes
cause that 'counts’. But it only counts relative to the
effects on our efferent processes. In short, we understand
what we see relative to what we do.
1. Reference.
We refer relative to the responses of our efferent
processes. 'Refer' usually requires an object. But an
object must be recognized. Recognition consists of storing
and comparing abstractions from efferent processes (which
necessarily include representations of afferent processes).
In the usual sense of 'refer' we intend to indicate whatever
caused or gave rise to a particular configuration of
efferent processes and/or abstractions from these processes
(perception). However, there is simply no direct access to
the cause of a perception. All that is internally
accessable is the information within the efferent processes,
and that is information which is realistically caused by
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external things. Selection is made among bits of
information, not among the external things.
De rived Fo r ms
Derived forms of reference, such as when a symbol
stands for something else, require more than one person, and
require communication. An explanation of this process is
beyond the scope of this paper, but some comments are in
order
.
Each person has the other as part of his or her
environment. One may apply a particular afferent pattern,
as in asking the name of a particular efferent pattern.
This, of course, assumes a good deal. It assumes that the
other’s interface has the same form, and that the other has
the same efferent pattern present. Aside from these
complications, the process is simple. The other, presumed
to have already programmed circuits to recognize the pattern
in its efferent circuits and to associate a particular
afferent pattern with that efferent pattern, simply selects
the associated afferent pattern, which we might call "giving
its name". Now, the first person associates his
corresponding efferent pattern with the earlier one and
’programs’ recognition circuits to respond appropriately.
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Extended to Semantic Environments
Ot course, this process of association and learning by
correlating efferent process patterns with subsequent
patterns can be applied where the efferent patterns arose
only from the afferent processes of others. (We can learn
names for groups of words from others.) We wouldn’t know
that the patterns arose only from the afferent processes of
others as that information is privileged to the god’s eye
view. But after eons of evolution of the hardware and the
interactions, we could get a pretty good picture which had
others in it. In fact, our picture could get so good that
we could mistake the picture for that which causes it.
1 differentiate between physical and semantic
environments. In physical environments the change of our
efferent processes in response to our afferent processes
depends upon the laws of nature and the structure of the
physical environment. In semantic environment the change of
our efferent processes in response to our afferent processes
depends upon the afferent processes of others. Now, in
truth, a detailed knowledge of the structure (and
programming) of another could allow us to cite only the laws
of nature in describing the relation between our afferent
and efferent processes, but it’s much more interesting not
to make that reduction - especially since we haven’t yet the
detailed knowledge necessary.
2. Representation.
The primary form of representation is simple copying.
The information has the same form, but a different location,
and is cause-effect connected to the original.
Derived Forms
Derived forms of representation involve cases with more
than one bit of information. In such cases, any
transformation on the bits can be associated and be a
representation. By dropping bits in the transformation, the
resulting patterns can be derived from more than one
original. By permuting the bits and by selectively
inverting them, a different pattern can be caused by an
original
.
Extended to Semantic Environments
Since associative patterns can be built up and
processed, transformed patterns can be manipulated. The
'environment' of a CPU consists of possibilities for the
efferent processes. If there are two CPU’s writing and
reading to the same two memory locations, then what is found
in the patterns of one CPU’s efferent processes depends upon
not only what that CPU wrote, but also on what the other CPU
wrote. (Carl could find black here after he painted white
here. )
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For comparison, suppose there were certain additional
’environment’ devices connected to the signal lines (along
with the memory cells). These devices could periodically
write into the memory cells. The CPU could detect and
identify patterns over time showing up in the memory cells,
patterns which were dependent upon what the CPU wrote as
well as on what the environment devices wrote.
3. Perception.
Generalizing perception is straightforward. Any
abstraction on the sequence of efferent processes can be
learned and subsequently recognized. By adding OR gates on
subsets of such patterns, 'fuzzy' recognition or similarity
measures can be instantiated. In fact, any logical formula
can be constructed of hardware. In the human brain with
from 1
0
1
a
to 10 1 * neurons each having thousands of
connections, there is room for a lot of patterns that can be
innately recognized (dedicated hardware circuits), or
learned and subsequently recognized (programmable circuits).
Generalized Comparison
At the base level the comparison is bitwise; however,
transformations on an abstraction from a bit sequence can
find 'similarities' (or differences). Logically, it is
appropriate to compare two bit sequences of the same length.
Comparing two sequences by a pattern-matching technique
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would allow skipping extra bits in one, or blocking out
templates, or other such means. Each is achievable through
abstraction on the bit sequences.
Extended to Semantic Environments
Any efferent process pattern, including higher level
abstractions, can be compared and recognition can occur. We
humans now give most of our processing faculties over to
patterns much removed from the physical enviro nme n t In
1921 Korzybski classified mankind as t ime-binders 9
. George
Miller called us ’ informavores
’
10
; we spend much more of our
efforts producing and sensing our semantic environment.
Teenagers now practically live in front of Music Television
(MTV) and get more input from music videos than anything
else. (Today’s high school graduates have averaged 12,000
hours in the classroom and 15,000 hours in front of the
tube. )
CHAPTER 1 I I
CONCLUSIONS
Essential to reference, representation, and perception
is the notion of aboutness. Symbols are "about" their
referents; representations are "about" what they stand for;
and perceptions are "about" that which gives rise to them
(whether in physical or semantic environments). However,
these are all distinct forms of "aboutness". The most
primitive of these forms is that found in representation.
Aboutness in this context is the aboutness that a copy has
of the original when that copy is caused by the original.
Its essential structure is that of the form of something
being reproduced.
Perception has its aboutness derived from
representation. Patterns in the information, which are
internal copies of sensor responses (and abstractions), are
stored and compared. Aboutness of these patterns is
directly derived from the aboutness of copying. When
selections are made among such patterns, and associated
afferent processes initiated, that is, when we choose from
among things we see and act accordingly, a 'mysterious
connection' is endowed between the internal representation
and that which causes it.
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A. Reference is Reducible to Cause and Effect
There is no mystery to reference. The simple processes
of selecting from among afferent processes enables a
differential response by the environment. Selecting a high
or low voltage for the control line causes a change in the
one or the other memory device. This causes one device to
be selected and the other device to be
’ de - s e 1 e c t ed
'
Selecting the voltage level causes one or the other of two
devices to be selected. Analogously, our primary form of
reference, selecting from afferent processes, results in our
taking actions of the form going to or grasping something.
B. Representation is Reducible to Cause and Effect.
The primary form of representation, the simple process
of copying the form of something, just involves the setting
of a voltage level (high or low). The propagation of
voltages in an electrical system is purely by cause and
effect. In our case, our senses respond to external
stimuli; it is copies of these responses that are copied and
propagated within the system. The "Brains in a Vat" point
of view is justified fully -- the skeptics cannot be
answered; whatever caused the sense organ to respond is not
reproduced within the system. It's all caused.
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C. Perception is Reducible to Cause and Effect.
As perception is nothing more than the recognition of
stored patterns, which are themselves mere copies of sense
organ responses, by the process of comparing, this too is
based solely on cause-effect connections.
A Final Note
1 have suggested an alteration to our use of the terms
reference’, ’representation’, and 'perception'. I have
suggested that the terras have not heretofore been univocally
used, that is, that there have been levels of structure
imbeded within our past usages of these terms. I view the
structure as essentially recursive. Each of these higher
forms is derived from a basic form. 1 have proposed
selection as the basic form for reference, copying as the
basic form for representation, and comparison as the basic
form of perception, and have shown in detail how these are
all related and instantiable solely in cause-effect
relations.
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Memory Cell # 1
L - Latch
Output Line
Input Line
Write Enable Line
Figure 1
A One Bit memory cell constructed with a simple latch.
Memory Cell # 1
t>8
Read Enable Line
Output Line
Input Line
Write Enable Line
L - Latch D - Driver
Figure 2.
A One Bit memory cell constructed with a latch and a driver.
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Control Line
Output Line
Input Line
L - Latch D - Driver
Figure 3
.
A One Bit memory cell constructed with a latch and a driver
using a single control line.
>-n
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Con t r o 1 Line
Output Line
Input Line
Enab 1 e Line
L - Latch D - Driver
i gu r e 4 .
One Bit memory cell with an enable line to control access
_
7 1
Memory Cell # 1
Address Line
Control Line
Data Line
Sense Line
Memory Cell # 0
it
hrkl
B-iXJ
^£7}!
I Inverter G - Gate L - Latch D - Driver
Figure 5 .
Two One Bit memory cells with different addresses
Afferent
Processes
Address Line
Control Line
Data Line
Sense Line
I - Inverter D - Driver
Figure 6 .
The One Bit CPU interface to its outside world.
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Figure 7 .
The One Bit CPU interface and connected Memory Cells.
Af f erent
Processes
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Address Line
Control Line
Enable Line
Data Line
Sense Line
I - Inverter G - Gate L - Latch D - Driver
Figure 8 .
The One Bit CPU with its memory cells and an enable line.
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